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ABSTRACT 
The artificial intelligence (AI) community has recently engaged in 
activism in relation to their employers, other members of the 
community, and their governments in order to shape the societal 
and ethical implications of AI. It has achieved some notable 
successes, but prospects for further political organising and 
activism are uncertain. We survey activism by the AI community 
over the last six years; apply two analytical frameworks drawing 
upon the literature on epistemic communities, and worker 
organising and bargaining; and explore what they imply for the 
future prospects of the AI community. Success thus far has hinged 
on a coherent shared culture, and high bargaining power due to 
the high demand for a limited supply of AI ‘talent’. Both are 
crucial to the future of AI activism and worthy of sustained 
attention. 
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1 Introduction 
“The best thing AI researchers can do is vote with their 
feet, not work with companies that have outcomes you 
don't agree with. There aren't enough researchers to go 
around, and attracting enough talent is important, so 
actually researchers individually have a lot of power. 
Through soft influence, you can influence a lot.” 
–Demis Hassabis, DeepMind CEO [49] 
The development and deployment of AI is likely to have 
important consequences for the global economy, society, and 
politics. AI deployment is already influencing markets and the 
economy, justice and distributive decisions by governments, and 
our elections [32, 63]. In coming years we may see the use of AI 
systems with novel capabilities in military domains [47]. 
Increasing use of increasingly powerful yet brittle systems carries 
accident risks, misuse risks, and structural risks [65] – risks to 
human security, and risks of societal inequality and 
discrimination [6, 37]. 
 The AI community has responded to these urgent issues 
by engaging in activism in order to promote the positive (in their 
view) societal and ethical effects of AI, and decrease the negative 
effects. ‘Activism’ includes a broad range of different kinds of 
social and political campaigning, organising and advocacy. This 
encompasses: issue-framing; agenda-setting; standard setting; 
private discussions with decision-makers; public campaigning in 
traditional and social media; establishing new fields and 
organisations; submissions to governmental inquiries; and classic 
labour tactics of boycotts and strikes. 
 The ‘AI community’ includes researchers, research 
engineers, faculty, graduate students, NGO workers, campaigners 
and some technology workers more generally –  those who would 
self-describe as working ‘on’, ‘with’ and ‘in’ AI and those 
analysing or campaigning on the effects of AI. This paper focuses 
especially on the AI community within corporate and academic 
labs in the US and Europe.  
 This activism has had some notable consequences so far: 
informing international negotiations, changing corporate 
strategy, and spurring the growth of research fields (see next 
section). Such activism may shape the manner and extent to which 
AI is militarised, and how AI companies address ethics and safety 
concerns. The AI community is an important autonomous actor 
with a distinctive set of viewpoints and interests. It needs to be 
accounted for in strategic or academic analysis and negotiated 
with by other actors. AI community activism may profoundly 
shape the development and deployment of this important set of 
technologies - and therefore shape our global economy, society 
and politics. 
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  This activism is therefore an important phenomenon in 
need of theoretical analysis. To date this analysis has been limited, 
with much of the discussion in ‘grey literature’ or in the media 
[60, 20, 55, 11]. We can identify (at least) two important questions 
for researchers: 
 How can we explain the activism by the AI community of 
recent years? 
 What are the future prospects of activism by the AI 
community? 
 In this paper, we overview some examples of recent 
activism by the AI community. We then apply two different 
analytical frameworks: epistemic communities and worker 
organising. We end by discussing some key common factors, and 
identifying research questions that could clarify the future 
prospects of activism by the AI community. 
2 Recent examples: 2013-2019 
This section is a brief overview of some examples of activism by 
the AI community over the last six years. The purpose of this 
section is to motivate the discussion by outlining some concrete 
examples to ground the later analytical discussion. See AI NOW’s 
‘Year in Review’ reports [9, 10, 11] for a more comprehensive 
descriptive treatment. 
 The last six years have seen a number of high-profile 
political actions taken by the AI community. We discuss three 
main examples: lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), 
ethics and safety, and employee organising. These three do not 
cover the entire range of activism, but are intended to be broadly 
illustrative. Under these headings we proceed in a roughly 
chronological manner. We begin in 2013 with the launch of the 
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, a key moment of epistemic 
community formation and a focus for worker organizing1. 
2.1 Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 
(LAWS) 
LAWS are weapons systems that can autonomously select and kill 
targets [35]. The AI community has been deeply involved with the 
debate over an international ban on LAWS [51]. Not only is the 
AI community a relevant expert community for advising on this 
debate, it is also being directly asked to work on the research and 
development (R&D) of LAWS [59]. 
In early 2013 the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots was 
formally launched to promote an international ban on the 
development and use of LAWS.  In late 2013 the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) agreed to begin 
considering LAWS. The CCW was the forum for negotiations over 
banning cluster munitions, landmines and blinding laser weapons. 
The AI community played key roles in the adoption of LAWS as 
an issue by arms control NGOs, the establishment of the UN 
process, and the ongoing work of the CCW [4].  
                                                                
1 The campaign’s roots stretch back at least to 2004 [8]. 
2 OpenAI was a non-profit and is now a company with a non-profit mission. 
3 The author is an Associate Fellow of the Centre. 
 The Campaign includes many members of the AI 
community. Their activism ranges from personal discussions with 
diplomats at the CCW to mass media ‘viral videos’ [7]. A key 
tactic has been the organisation of mass Open Letters. In July 2015 
an Open Letter on LAWS expressed community concern. It has 
been signed to date by 4,500 AI and robotics researchers [22]. This 
was followed by another Open Letter on LAWS [24], when the 
Meeting of Experts changed to a Group of Governmental Experts 
(GGE) at the CCW. 
 This effort has also included intra-community 
organising. One example is the April 2018 Korea Advanced 
Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) boycott. The 50 
signatories committed to boycott all collaborations with any part 
of KAIST, due to concerns that a KAIST centre had a LAWS 
collaboration with Hanwha Systems, a leading South Korean arms 
company. KAIST soon clarified that they would not work on 
LAWS [25]. 
 Activism has also included extensive and intense 
negotiations within technology companies, discussed below. 
2.2 Ethics and safety 
There has been sustained activism from the AI community to 
emphasise that AI should be developed and deployed in a safe and 
beneficial manner. This has involved Open Letters, AI principles, 
the establishment of new centres, and influencing governments.  
 The Puerto Rico Conference in January 2015 was a 
landmark event to promote the beneficial and safe development 
of AI. It led to an Open Letter signed by over 8,000 people calling 
for the safe and beneficial development of AI, and a research 
agenda to that end [21]. 
 The Asilomar Conference in January 2017 led to the 
Asilomar AI Principles, signed by several thousand AI researchers 
[23]. Over a dozen sets of principles from a range of groups 
followed [61]. 
 The AI community has established several research 
groups to understand and shape the societal impact of AI. AI 
conferences have also expanded their work to consider the impact 
of AI. New groups include: 
 Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency in Machine 
Learning (FAT ML) (December 2014) 
 OpenAI (December 2015)2  
 Centre for Human-Compatible AI (August 2016) 
 Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence (October 
2016)3 
 Algorithmic Justice League (November 2016) 
 DeepMind Ethics and Society (October 2017) 
 AI Now Institute (November 2017) 
 UK Government’s Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation 
(November 2017)4 
Especially notable is the Partnership on Artificial Intelligence to 
Benefit People and Society (September 2016). The Partnership 
brings together over 90 companies and non-profits, and is 
4 The Centre was proposed and advocated for by the AI community, and analyses 
AI’s societal and ethical implications. 
  
 
 
exploring best-practice recommendations for the community as a 
whole [46]. 
 The AI community has also contributed to over 30 
national and international AI strategies [13]. The High-Level 
Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence to the European 
Commission (HLEG-AI) is made up of 52 experts from academia, 
civil society, and industry. Their work led to Ethics Guidelines, 
and policy and investment recommendations, for trustworthy AI 
[33]. EU Commissioner Margrethe Vestager has strongly 
indicated that forthcoming EU regulation on AI will be based on 
this work by the AI community. 
2.3 Organising 
2018 saw an upturn in political organising, especially within large 
technology companies: the ‘tech resistance’. 
 The most prominent example of this activism has been 
Google. Google’s involvement with Department of Defense’s 
(DoD) Project Maven was revealed in March 2018. 3,000 
employees signed an Open Letter opposing it in April [28]. In 
June, Google announced it would not renew the Project Maven 
contract and released its AI Principles. In October, Google also 
dropped out of the DoD’s JEDI cloud bidding process. 
 However, in August, Google’s secret ‘Project Dragonfly’ 
(a censored Chinese search engine) was revealed. This was 
opposed by another Open Letter. Two anonymous employees 
wrote in an email circulating the Dragonfly letter: “Individual 
employees organizing against the latest dubious project cannot be 
our only safeguard against unethical decisions. This amounts to 
unsustainable ethics whack-a-mole” [29]. 
 In November, 20,000 employees and contractors took 
part in a one-day strike, or ‘Google walkout’, protesting sexual 
harassment and misconduct. This contributed to the end of ‘forced 
arbitration’ for full time workers [30]. 
 Not all organising, however, was so clearly successful. 
Ongoing debates include corporate partnerships with 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP). In June, perhaps as a result of the Trump 
administration’s family separation policy [10], several groups 
released open letters [42, 2, 52]. 
3 Analytical frameworks: two lenses 
We reviewed three examples of activism over the last six years, 
including some key successes. We now draw on two different 
analytical frameworks: epistemic communities, and worker 
organising. Both of these can provide insights into why this 
activism is occurring, how these successes have been achieved, 
and what its future prospects are. 
 We address each framework in turn. For each 
framework, we briefly describe it and explain its relevance to our 
discussion. We then discuss what factors are seen as predictive of 
success for the relevant group within the framework, and ask to 
what extent those factors apply to our case – and will continue to 
apply over the next few years. 
3.1 Epistemic communities 
An epistemic community is a network of knowledge-based 
experts: “professionals with recognised expertise and competence 
in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-
relevant knowledge within that domain” [31]. Crucially, they also 
share causal and principled beliefs about their domain, notions of 
validity, and a common policy project [1]. 
 Historical examples include nuclear physicists, 
chemists, biologists, and climate scientists [31]. Epistemic 
communities have been identified as playing key roles in several 
policy debates, such as the role of the nuclear weapons scientists 
and strategists in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty [1]. 
 This framework is relevant to the AI community. They 
are technical experts that have a clearly recognised and valid 
claim to authority and expertise in the domain of AI. There is a 
strong set of shared causal beliefs and notions of validity, and 
common policy projects. 
 Scepticism has been expressed about the coherence of 
the epistemic community on military AI, especially about whether 
it is presently sufficient to play a similar role to the ABM 
community [39, 47]. It clearly has not yet been sufficient to pass 
an international ban or block military AI R&D efforts. However, 
it has put LAWS firmly on the international agenda, and the 
Campaign’s prospects look similar to the landmines and cluster 
munitions campaigns at similar stages. For now, it has temporarily 
paused, and perhaps lastingly complicated, the relationship 
between the US military and US tech firms (most importantly 
Google). Also, we are considering activism on a wider set of topics 
than just LAWS. The AI community’s policy projects also include 
emphasising ethics, societal benefit and safety, and opposing 
particular choices by company management. 
 In general, when are epistemic communities more likely 
to be persuasive? Cross [12] identifies five key factors: 1) the issue 
is uncertain and salient; 2) the community has access to, and 
understanding of, decision-makers and other actors; 3) there is 
‘policy field coherence’, 4) they seek to influence an early or 
technocratic phase in the policy process; and 5) they are seen as 
credible and have a more cohesive, certain coalition than their 
competitors.  
 We suggest these factors currently apply to the AI 
community, and are likely to largely continue to apply. 
1) The ethical, military and societal implications of AI is a complex 
and new set of issues. It has become politically salient over the 
last few years. 
 It is likely to remain quite uncertain. The extent to 
which there is a sense of perceived crisis may fade over time as 
the issue becomes less new and begins to be untangled. However, 
it is likely to remain technically complex, as well as politically 
salient, as AI continues to impact our economy and society.  
2) The AI community has access to top decision-makers, both 
corporate and political. They have also been able to anticipate 
other actor’s preferences and actions, such as anticipating those 
of the different national delegations during the international 
LAWS negotiations. 
  This high-level access is likely to continue – policy-
maker interest sees no sign of slacking. It is open whether they 
will continue to be anticipatory. 
3) ‘Policy field coherence’ refers to there being respected 
quantitative data, the issue involving technical systems, and the 
norms and goals of the community being compatible with existing 
institutional norms. The issues for the AI community have 
involved the interaction of human-made technical systems with 
social systems, instead of just involving social systems, and there 
has been respected quantitative data on, for example, the extent 
of bias or the frequency of mistakes by ML systems [37]. 
 There will likely continue to be policy field coherence. 
Indeed the availability of quantitative data is likely to improve 
over time. However the lack of quantitative data about the 
humanitarian impact of LAWS (which will continue until if and 
when they are deployed) may continue to limit the persuasiveness 
of those pushing for an international ban. 
4) The AI community has sought to influence the initial terms of 
the debate and to focus on subsystem, technocratic phases. For 
example, activism in 2015 helped shape the terms of the debate 
around ethical, safe and beneficial AI – and then how that was 
translated into national ethical principles and strategies. 
 Over time, the terms of the debates around the 
development and deployment of AI are likely to become more 
fixed, and activism will have to seek to influence later stages in 
decision-making processes. The societal implications of AI may 
also become more pronounced, and/or entangled with broader 
political beliefs. However, continued technical breakthroughs 
may create continued capability jumps (such as language models 
and fake news generation), routinely posing new policy problems. 
5) The AI community has been quite coherent and certain of its 
aims in some respects: pushing for serious consideration of the 
military and societal impacts of AI by companies and 
governments. It seems more cohesive than those pushing to 
deproblematise the issue. It also shares a high level of professional 
norms and status. 
 It is unclear whether they will continue to be more 
coherent and certain than competing networks, especially in the 
debate over the acceptability of working on military AI, including 
LAWS. The network pushing for an accommodation with 
militaries may prove more cohesive and certain. Community 
credibility seems unlikely to radically change. Marginal changes 
could occur, for example through the further democratisation of 
machine learning (ML) through MOOCs and other online 
platforms. 
 Overall then, the AI community has achieved some 
successes as an epistemic community as the scope conditions (1), 
political opportunity structure (2) and policy field coherence (3) 
have been favourable, and the AI community has sought to 
influence early and technocratic phases in the policy process (4) 
and built fairly cohesive coalitions (5). 
 Factors likely to continue include high-level access 
being good; being able to deal with technocratic aspects of 
decision-making; sharing a high status; and being able to draw on 
evidence on which they are expert. However, over the next few 
years novelty will decrease, the terms of debate will become more 
set, and the entire issue-area may become more politicised. The 
window of influence may be shrinking, but it is unlikely to close, 
as the issue-area will remain uncertain and complex. A key 
question for further research is whether the AI community will 
continue to be cohesive and certain in its aims. 
3.2 Worker organizing and bargaining 
Freeman and Medoff [19] influentially distinguish between the 
‘two faces’ of organised labour. The first, 'monopoly face' is that 
of union monopoly power used to raise members' wages. Now, 
however, the emphasis is typically more on offsetting 
informational and power asymmetries between workers and 
management [5]. 
 More relevant to our focus, however, is their second, 
“collective voice/institutional response” face. This builds on 
Hirschman’s [34] conception of ‘voice’ as the ability to “change, 
rather than escape from [i.e. exit], an objectionable state of 
affairs.” 
 Worker organising and bargaining means their ability 
“to 'voice' their concerns and demands rather than immediately 
'exit'—that is, quit the job”, “to voice complaints and see them 
addressed through collective bargaining” [19]. Worker or 
employee voice – whether formally through a union or not – has 
become a key topic for disciplines such as labour economics, 
industrial relations and organisational behaviour [62]. 
 It need not refer just to improving working conditions, 
but also to encouraging one’s firm to advocate for public policies. 
For example, US corporate engagement on LGBT rights has been 
largely driven by employee organizations in highly-educated 
workforces advocating for management to take public stands 
advocating for LGBT rights [40]. 
 Key to this framework is the ability of different actors to 
have an agreement on their terms, that is the ‘bargaining power’ 
of workers and management, based on the “ability to impose costs 
on the other side for failing to agree and to avoid or absorb its 
own costs from failing to agree” [14]. 
 This framework is relevant to the AI community. 
Almost all members of the AI community are employees, rather 
than business-owners. Indeed, the AI community is largely 
located within fairly large corporate and academic labs. 
 Formal unionisation rates are low in technology 
companies, though higher in academia [18]. However, it is clear 
that the AI community has substantial bargaining power, of the 
type described in our opening quote. This is reflected in high 
salaries. The New York Times reports that “A.I. specialists with 
little or no industry experience can make between $300,000 and 
$500,000 a year in salary and stock. Top names can receive […] 
millions” [41]. Nevertheless, groups like the Tech Workers 
Coalition have emphasised the difference in power across the 
industry – from a researcher with a ML PhD to a gig economy 
Mechanical Turk contractor. The Coalition’s work began in 
attempting to organise across more of the tech workforce [58]. 
The organizing examples described above often involved workers 
adapting classic collective bargaining tactics for their situations. 
 While this framework is directly relevant to employees, 
more generally, AI community activism can be framed as a set of 
  
 
 
strategic interactions between actors, each with different 
incentives, resources and constraints – where outcomes are the 
result of bargaining between these actors [38]. 
 In general, when are workers more likely to be 
persuasive (or successful) with the management of their 
organisation? Dau-Schmidt & Ellis [14] identify five key economic 
factors: 1) the nature of the organisation's product and services; 2) 
the structure of bargaining; 3) the organisation's technology of 
production; 4) general economic conditions; and 5) the employees' 
commitment to collective action. 
 We suggest these factors currently benefit the AI 
community, and are likely to largely continue to benefit it. 
1) Corporate organisations’ products and services typically 
require ongoing maintenance, so management is less able to 
absorb costs from failing to agree with its employees. Also, large 
tech companies are generally consumer-facing (B2C) rather than 
business-facing (B2B) firms, which makes them more susceptible 
to public – consumer – sentiment. Google is more susceptible than 
Palantir to consumer sentiment because they rely on the public 
using their services, rather than Palantir which relies more on 
large clients. Tech workers have been adept at mobilising media 
interest and public support. The nature of these products and 
services is unlikely to change dramatically in the coming years. 
2) The structural landscape of bargaining is largely tilted in favour 
of employers. While many tech workers are well-paid enough to 
have a decent amount of runway, and are able to ‘exit’ to similarly 
well-paid jobs elsewhere, they are hampered by the lack of 
unionisation. Another issue is the widespread use by tech 
companies of non-disclosure agreements (NDAs). This tends to 
limit workers’ ability to publicly voice concerns – even after they 
leave the company. 
 This is likely to continue, but may diminish marginally 
if there are explicit offers of financial or legal support from worker 
groups like the Tech Worker’s Coalition or civil society groups 
like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). However, several 
centre-left politicians in the US and Europe propose more 
antitrust scrutiny of tech companies, and to change union 
regulation to empower them, which would shift the landscape. 
3) Organisations employing members of the AI community 
typically depend on highly-skilled workers. Replacements are 
hard to obtain, and the organisation cannot continue with just a 
skeleton crew. This means that the organisations are less able to 
absorb the costs of failing to agree a deal, improving worker 
bargaining power. 
 This is likely to continue, but may change marginally. If 
these organisations turn from more R&D-style work to more 
implementation-style work, then workers may not need to be as 
highly-skilled. This may shift bargaining power. 
4) A key question about the general economic conditions is the 
balance of supply and demand of potential replacement workers. 
Estimates of the ‘talent pool’ vary widely, from 22,400-36,500 [26] 
to 300,000 [54]. The high salaries commanded in the field 
demonstrate that supply is not meeting demand. 
 However, various sources of evidence point to an 
increase in the talent supply in coming years [53]. Several 
governments have made large commitments of money for 
education: the UK is supporting 1,000 PhDs [16]. The 2017 CRA 
Taulbee Survey shows a continued increase in the number of 
degrees and enrolment, at doctorate, masters and undergraduate 
level [64]. Note that this does not include quasi-academic routes: 
MOOCs such as Andrew Ng’s or fast.ai, coder bootcamps, and so 
on. 
 We should expect an increase in the supply of talent 
over the coming years (a PhD in ML, for example, typically takes 
four years to complete in the UK and six years in the USA). Other 
things being equal, this increase in the number of potential 
workers would tend to decrease worker power. 
 However, this assumes that supply increases more than 
demand. The following years may well see demand for ML talent 
continue to increase – keeping track with or even exceeding the 
increase in supply. This demand may increase as AI and robotics 
becomes more technologically ready or industrialised. If data and 
computing power continue to grow, more areas may become well-
suited to ML approaches, which might also increase demand. The 
future balance of supply and demand is a key question. 
5) Commitment to collective action is a similar factor to epistemic 
community cohesion. Willingness and ability to (threaten) exit 
seems fairly high. There have been several high-profile exits over 
‘employee voice’ issues [44, 45, 48]. A small-scale survey of UK 
tech workers suggests 16% of all people in AI have left their 
company over the issue of working on products they felt might be 
harmful for society, compared to 5% of all tech workers [43]. 
 A key question is whether the predicted new ‘talent’ will 
be socialised to a similar extent, and through similar means, to 
existing workers. A larger AI community, that has not all been to 
the same small academic conferences for several years, may be 
less cohesive. Conversely, enrolment in university 'ethics in AI' 
courses may make the next generation more ethically engaged. 
Also, if the momentum behind the political organising continues, 
it will increasingly be seen as the norm. Key organisers might 
receive more training and support. The ad-hoc arrangements that 
have characterised the political organising of the AI community 
so far might become more institutionalised. 
 Overall then, the AI community has achieved some 
successes as workers organising and bargaining with their 
employers. This may be attributed to the organisational products 
and services (1), organisational production technology (3), and the 
general economic conditions (4) all being favourable – though the 
structure of bargaining has not been (2) – and the AI community 
having been fairly committed to collective action (5). 
 Factors likely to continue include the products and 
services being consumer-facing and difficult to stockpile; reliance 
on high-skilled labour; and the unequal bargaining structure. 
However it is unclear what the balance of talent supply and 
demand will be, and to what extent the AI community will 
continue to be committed to collective action. These are key 
questions for further research.  
4 Discussion and further research 
What are the prospects for the AI community being able to 
successfully continue its activism over the coming years? Two 
 factors have been identified as key questions for further research: 
the balance of talent supply and demand and the cohesiveness of 
the AI community. 
 We identified a small, narrow, talent pool as a key factor 
in the bargaining power of the AI community. We need to be able 
to assess relative supply and demand of AI talent over the coming 
years. Further quantitative research is needed into, for example, 
the current size of the talent supply, collated salary information, 
enrolment rates, or future demand projections for AI talent. 
 The AI community has several resources at its disposal 
to maintain and deepen its social, organisational, ethical and 
political cohesion. The AI community has a strong shared culture, 
with strong norms of responsibility, ‘do-it-yourself’ and mutual 
support. The community publish at and attend the same major 
conferences (such as AAAI, NeurIPS, ICML and IJCAI), and 
publish on the same sites such as arXiv and GitHub. Virtually 
none of these outlets charge for publication or access, and are 
often maintained by the community. This culture can be seen in 
the closed-access journal boycott [17] and the name change to 
NeurIPS [3]. 
 The AI community has made use of institutional 
enabling structures: the Future of Life Institute as a coordinator of 
international Open Letters; the Tech Workers Coalition and the 
Partnership on AI as distributors of best practice; corporate digital 
tools such as email mailing lists and internal chat rooms; and 
social media such as Twitter and Medium as a way of 
communicating demands. These structures could be developed, 
better funded and institutionalized – and key organisers could 
receive more training and support. Further research into the AI 
community’s ability and willingness to maintain and deepen its 
cohesion – and the structures and institutions that support that – 
is needed. 
 Further research could also extend our analysis to a 
broader range of regional and sectoral contexts, to a broader range 
of actors with influence over companies, and to other analytical 
frameworks. 
5 Conclusion 
The AI community is acting together – it is organised. It has won 
some key successes. And yet its future prospects are uncertain. 
Useful insights can be drawn from the literature on epistemic 
communities and worker organising. There are good precedents 
for highly-skilled groups engaging in activism as epistemic 
communities and valuable employees, thereby influencing policy 
and corporate outcomes. Indeed, the AI community has already 
had some clear successes around LAWS, ethics and safety, and 
employee organising. Whether this will continue is less clear. The 
future balance of AI talent supply and demand and the future 
cohesion of the AI community are key questions for further 
research.  
6 Appendix: Veto players 
Veto players are individual or collective actors whose agreement 
(by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change of 
the status quo [56]. This framework is generally applied to 
comparative politics, where it has been influential [36] though 
contested [27]. Notable examples include comparing political 
decision-making in parliamentary and presidential systems. It is 
also relevant to the AI community and can shed some novel, 
interesting light on our discussion. 
 The debate in the USA over the militarisation of AI and 
LAWS can be viewed as the interaction of three actors: employees, 
management of AI organisations (academic groups or technology 
companies) and the government [38]. Crucially, one can view this 
as a veto player situation. The current status quo is one in which 
the AI community does not generally research LAWS. There are 
few US AI organisations, especially the most prominent, engaged 
in LAWS R&D for the US government. The US government, and 
management at several organisations, would like that to change – 
to a situation in which there is widespread collaboration from 
many organisations, including the most prominent. For the status 
quo to change, all actors must agree. However, a significant group 
of employees is not agreeing to this change. 
 In general, when are veto players more likely to be able 
to prevent a change of the status quo? Tsebelis [57] identifies 
three key factors: 
1) the number of veto players; 
2) lack of congruence; and 
3) cohesion. 
 We suggest that these factors currently apply to some 
extent to the AI community, and are likely to largely continue to 
apply. 
1) The number of veto players is not particularly high. It seems 
that perhaps management and the government believed they were 
in a two-player game. They seem not to have been prepared for 
the activism of the AI community on this topic, which indicates a 
three-player game. 
2) The policy positions of the players have been rather dissimilar. 
Many governments and company managers want collaboration 
on military AI, and specifically LAWS, to not only be widespread 
but unproblematised. Many, perhaps most, employees do not. 
 This seems likely to continue, though, for example, the 
process of developing and exploring the proposed Department of 
Defense ethics principles [15] may achieve an accommodation 
between Silicon Valley and the Pentagon, increasing congruence 
between the players. 
3) The relative similarity of policy positions amongst the AI 
community has been discussed above. There is clearly a debate 
about the extent to which they should be involved in the 
militarisation of AI, especially LAWS R&D, and whether there 
should be an international ban. This debate is likely to continue. 
 The AI community has achieved some successes as a 
veto player as the congruence between the players has been low 
(2), and the AI community has been fairly coherent (3). This 
situation is broadly likely to continue. However, whether the AI 
community will continue to be cohesive is a key question. 
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